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Abstract
We explore the relationship between ballot measures on issues salient to Millennials and their turnout in presidential
and midterm elections. Both scholars and observers in the media have worried about decreasing levels of citizen partic-
ipation, particularly among young voters. We demonstrate that one way to engage Millennials into traditional forms of
political participation is through ballot measures that focus on issues salient to their generation (marijuana liberalization
and higher education reform). We show that not only do these measures increase Millennial voting, but they erase dif-
ference in turnout levels between Millennials and older generations. This effect is primarily concentrated in low-turnout
contexts such as midterm elections, indicating that these measures may be playing a similar mobilization role in midterm
elections as presidential campaigns do in turnout out low-propensity voters.
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1. Introduction
Scholars have documented a significant decrease in
turnout across the US and other Western democracies
over the past half century (Franklin, 2004; McDonald,
2018). Millennial voters (those born between 1982 and
1996) are no exception to this trend. Millennial voter
turnout barely reached 50 percent in the 2016 presiden-
tial election, compared to 70 percent for Baby Boomers
(Fry, 2016). Some activists want to use high profile bal-
lot measures on issues such as marijuana legalization
to increase youth voter turnout, similar to how activists
on the right attempted to use same-sex marriage bans
to turn out social conservatives in the 2004 Presidential
election (Campbell & Monson, 2008).
We test if Millennial salient measures increase Mil-
lennial voter turnout in both presidential and midterm
elections. We argue that Millennial-oriented ballot mea-
sures provide a path for engaging these voters, who ap-
pear to be disenchanted with politics due to years of per-
ceived political dysfunction (Foa &Mounk, 2016). Millen-
nials have a cynical view of politics as the issues most
important to them scarcely make it onto a party’s plat-
form (Lawless & Fox, 2015). Understanding what drives
turnout among the largest cohort of potential voters is
fundamental to understanding democracy in the US. This
is especially important as Millennials are now the largest
living generation. Understanding their political behavior
and opinions, and how they compare to those of older
generations, is vital to understanding the trajectory of
participation in American politics.
We argue that ballot measures increase Millennial
turnout in midterm and presidential elections most
when the proposals are focused on issues particularly
salient to them. We focus on higher education reform
and marijuana liberalization because of their unique
level of interest in both issues. Millennials began en-
rolling in college at the same time as the cost of col-
lege tuition, fees, and room and board skyrocketed. They
hold the highest amounts of student debt of any gener-
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ation. Millennials’ experience with higher education is
uniquely marked by a hyper-concern for the cost of and
access to higher education institutions (Rouse & Ross,
2018; Taylor & Keeter, 2010). Millennials are also the
most supportive of marijuana legalization. In 2016, 71
percent of Millennials said that marijuana use should be
legal. Just 33 percent of the silent generation, 56 per-
cent of Baby Boomers, and 57 percent of Generation X
respondents saymarijuana should bemade legal (Geiger,
2016). Their distinct opinions on marijuana and unique
experiencewith higher educationmake both policy areas
highly salient for Millennial voters relative to the rest of
the population. These two issues should mobilize Millen-
nials more than other generations1.
Over the past sixteen years, measures on marijuana
liberalization and higher education reform have been
placed on the ballot and voted on across the country.We
collect a unique dataset of state ballot measures on mar-
ijuana liberalization and higher education reform. We
pair these data with the Current Population Survey from
2002–2016 to model voter turnout. We find that Millen-
nials are more likely to vote when there are more mea-
sures on issues salient to them. The increases in turnout
erase differences between Millennials and other gener-
ations. When Millennials can vote on issues that are im-
portant to them, they are just as likely to vote as the rest
of the population.
2. Millennial and Their Political Behavior
Much of the research on age or youth turnout has fo-
cused on life-cycle effects and maturation, which is the
idea that at different points, or ages, in one’s life po-
litical participation becomes more important, such as
having a family or nearing retirement (Converse, 1972;
Plutzer, 2002). However, many have found that the
young turnout to vote at the lowest rates not due to
life-stage effects but because of a variety of genera-
tional factors, like low social capital, apathy towards
the government, and lack of interest in politics overall
(Putnam, 2000; Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980). Most
simply, there are group-wide trends of lower participa-
tion, and the gap is not closed as one ages, thus indicat-
ing a cohort effect rather than an effect of aging.
Research in comparative politics on voter turnout
has moved beyond life-cycle effects to evaluate genera-
tional differences in political behavior (Inglehart &Welzel,
2005). This research emphasizes the distinct socioeco-
nomic context that each cohort of voters’ face. Currently,
the youngest voters in Western countries vote at lower
rates than previous generations when they were the
same age (Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1980;
Franklin, 2004; Miller, Shanks, & Shapiro, 1996). Failure
to account for cohort-effects in political behavior leads re-
searchers to omit the shared experiences and opinions of
a generation and overestimate the effect of age. Incorpo-
rating generational effects into models of voter turnout
provides us with a way to separate the persistent effect
of generation and the temporary effect of age.
Scholars over the past 50 years have conceptualized
age-related cohorts in the US into generations. In demo-
graphic research, like that done by Pew Research Center,
current generations are categorized as, the Silent Gener-
ation, Baby Boomers, Generation X, the Millennials, and
Generation Z. Those belonging to the Silent Generation
are the oldest Americans. They are classified as those
born before 1946. Baby Boomers, the next oldest group
are those born between 1946 and 1964. Generation X
are those born between 1965 and 1980. Millennials are
those who were born in 1981 to 1996, and Generation Z
are those born after 1996 (Taylor, 2016).
Political differences between generations have been
well documented (Putnam, 2000; Robinson & Jackson,
2001). Inter-generational differences extend beyond be-
liefs and include differences in political behavior (Dalton,
2015). Millennials are less likely to vote, donate money,
and contact legislators than all previous generations
(Franklin, 2004; Henn,Weinstein, & Forrest, 2005; Klecka,
1971). Dalton (2008) attributes low levels of Millennial
turnout to dissatisfaction with the political elites and the
economic system. Dalton also documents a generational
inclination towards non-traditional, or engaged, forms of
political participation, like protesting, consumer activism,
and volunteering with non-profits in their communities.
The 2008 Presidential election sparked increased in-
terest in understanding what drives youth political be-
havior due to their uncharacteristically high turnout, in-
terest, and activism in President Obama’s presidential
campaign. Obama’s success in mobilizing young voters
led researchers to seek to explain why youth turnout was
so high in this election but not in others. Some of these
scholars found that the youth are not participating in pol-
itics as much as other generational cohorts because of
perceptions of the political systembeing unresponsive or
corrupt. Lawless and Fox (2015) argue the mean-spirited
and dysfunctional nature of American politics has led
the youth to doubt the ability of elected officials and
the government to be an effective entity for promoting
positive change. Obama’s message of hope and change
may have cut through this perception. As demonstrated
by the Obama and Sanders campaigns, when candidates
or campaigns respond to young people’s disillusionment,
we observe relatively high levels of young voter turnout.
Although younger generations, includingMillennials, are
not engaging in politics as much as earlier generations,
some conditions lead to spikes in their participation. In
this study, we explore if direct democracy can counter-
actMillennial disillusionmentwith the political system to
increase their turnout.
3. Direct Democracy and Voting
Direct democracy in American states, particularly the bal-
lot initiative, has been thoroughly studied for decades
1 All estimations will compare turnout of Millennials to turnout of Generation X, Baby Boomers, and the Silent Generation.
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both for its effect on state policy outputs (Gerber, 1996;
Matsusaka, 2001) and the public (Smith, 2001; Tolbert,
Bowen, & Donovan, 2009; Tolbert, McNeal, & Smith,
2003). Every state has some formof direct democracy, be
it the initiative process, referendums, or both, although
there is significant institutional variation in whether they
have the initiative process and the ease of qualifying
measures on the ballot (Bowler &Donovan, 2004).While
ballot measures are used to accomplish specific policies
goals, their usage changes the election environment for
states, and has been found to produce externalities in
voter participation and attitudes.
There are two principle explanations for how direct
democracy increases voter turnout. One is that direct
democratic institutions have a long term educative ef-
fect, increasing voter interest in their government and in
being active democratic participants (Bowler & Donovan,
2002; Tolbert & Smith, 2005; Tolbert et al., 2003). Pro-
gressive activists hoped the ballot initiative would fos-
ter the citizenry in becoming a new branch of govern-
ment that could be active in the policy making process.
Activists hoped that over time, as the institutions of bal-
lot initiatives and referendummatured, voters would be-
comemore engaged in the political process because they
were given more influence in policy making. Researchers
have also found that previous initiative use increases
turnout (Bowler &Donovan, 2002; Hero& Tolbert, 2004).
Tolbert, Grummel and Smith (2001) show an increase in
voter turnout in initiative states regardless of the num-
ber of measures on the ballot. Based on these findings,
a key understanding of direct democracy is that it seems
to empower voters even if it is not being used in that spe-
cific election.
The second explanation argues that having a pro-
cedure for direct democracy is insufficient for driving
turnout. Rather, turnout effects are observed whenmea-
sures qualify to be on the ballot. There is large varia-
tion in the types of direct democracy (initiatives, popu-
lar referendum, veto referendum, etc.) as well as the re-
quirements for placing measures on the ballot, leading
to large variation in ballot measure usage in the states
(Bowler & Donovan, 2004). Once on the ballot, direct
democracy increases turnout by mobilizing individuals
in support of specific issues (Biggers, 2011; Childers &
Binder, 2012; Tolbert et al., 2009). This effect is partic-
ularly large when ballot measures are salient to the pub-
lic (Dyck & Seabrook, 2010). The most notable examples
of this phenomena were the same-sex marriage bans
on the ballot in the 2004 general election. These mea-
sures increased turnout among Evangelicals and other
conservative Christians relative to the rest of the pop-
ulation (Campbell & Monson, 2008; Smith, DeSantis, &
Kassel, 2006). These voters felt disproportionately pas-
sionate about the issue, and the mobilization from the
measures comparatively increased their turnout. This
supports Nicholson’s (2003) argument that direct democ-
racy will have the strongest effect when voters are aware
of ballot measures. Holding all else constant, ballot mea-
sure usage increases turnout above and beyond the ef-
fect of having a direct democratic process.
Like most research on ballot measures, turnout ef-
fects must be contextualized. Direct democracy typi-
cally increases turnout in low-turnout contexts, such as
midterm elections (Schlozman & Yohai, 2008). Presiden-
tial elections have significantly higher levels of voter
turnout (A. Campbell, 1960; J. E. Campbell, 1987), so
any mobilization effects from ballot measures may be
washed out by the overwhelming turnout effects of pres-
idential campaigns. Research on the educative effects
of direct democracy (and more specifically, ballot initia-
tives) has been more mixed (Seabrook, Dyck, & Lascher,
2015). Political scientists have generally found support
for more ballot measures being associated with higher
voter turnout, particularly in conditions where turnout
is historically lower (midterm elections, for example).
Higher turnoutmay be a result of both the long-term and
short-term effects of direct democracy.
4. Direct Democracy and Millennial Voting
We believe that an understudied area of direct democ-
racy’s mobilization effect is how it interacts differently
with each living generation. We argue that when mea-
sures are salient to Millennials, they will vote at rela-
tively high rates. First, the empowering effect of bal-
lot measures has been shown to be concentrated most
among low-propensity voters and in low-turnout envi-
ronments (Schlozman & Yohai, 2008; Tolbert & Smith,
2005). Highly engaged voters will likely vote with or with-
out measures on the ballot. However, the decreased
turnout in midterm elections creates the opportunity for
interest groups to mobilize and persuade non-regular
voters who are passionate about an issue to participate.
Even a small increase in turnout from low-propensity vot-
ers can lead to a proposal being adopted or struck down
(Anzia, 2011, 2013).MostMillennials are non-habituated
voters, but potential voters with strong and serious con-
cern for salient issues like higher education reform and
marijuana liberalization.
The turnout effects should be primarily focused on
voters who are on the cusp of voting but need some addi-
tional stimulus to turnout. Historically, there is a popula-
tion of low propensity voters that turnout in competitive
presidential elections (A. Campbell, 1960), but turnout
at much lower rates in midterm elections when the pres-
ident they voted for is not on the ballot (J. E. Campbell,
1987). Compared to other ages, younger voters are less
likely to turnout to vote, especially in midterm elections
(Campbell et al., 1980; Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980).
We have also observed generational declines in political
participation, including in voting, across all of the West-
ern industrialized democratic nations (Franklin, 2004).
Turnout in midterm and presidential elections varies
greatly, with much lower turnout in midterm elections
where information and excitement are lower. Millenni-
als make an ideal candidate for researching the effects
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of direct democracy on turnout because they are a large
pool of potential voters who decide to stay home dur-
ing midterm elections, but that could potentially be mo-
bilized under the right conditions.
An additional reason to study Millennials is because
they are relatively new to politics and may lack the influ-
ence of older generations in the policy-making process.
There is a substantial literature that finds that not all
groups are treated the same by policy-makers (Boushey,
2016). We argue that the record levels of disenchant-
ment with the democratic process among Millennial vot-
ers (Foa &Mounk, 2016) is a product of a lack of policies
salient to their preferences. These disengaged voters feel
that traditional policy-making institutions donot respond
to their preferences, thus they feel that voting is less im-
portant. Ballot measures provide a way to empower Mil-
lennials to actively pass legislation that corresponds with
their policy preferences. A similar dynamic has been ob-
served in off-year elections voterswith a stake in the elec-
tion outcome, such as members of an interest group that
is affected by election results, vote in disproportionately
high levels (Anzia, 2011, 2013). While Millennials are not
organized as a unified interest group, we follow a simi-
lar logic by arguing that Millennials will be more likely to
votewhen elections incorporate issues important to their
generation. Two such issues are higher education reform
and marijuana liberalization. We identify these issues as
salient to Millennials for several reasons.
Millennials are the most educated generation in
American history in terms of earning college degrees
(Taylor, 2016). Millennials also reached college age at
the time where the rate of inflation for a higher educa-
tion rapidly increased. As of December 2016, the average
American student left university with over $30,000 in stu-
dent loan debt (National Center for Education Statistics,
2017). This number, even when adjusted for inflation,
has risen by over 530 percent since the 1960s. Unlike
other generations, Millennials cite the rising cost of ed-
ucation as one of the most important issues facing them
today (Rouse & Ross, 2018). ForMillennials, a politician’s
stance on higher education funding and debt forgiveness
is a top policy issuewhen consideringwho to vote for, un-
like non-Millennial voters (Rouse & Ross, 2018).
Second, we consider marijuana liberalization as a
salient issue because Millennials have distinct attitudes
about marijuana. Millennials support both medical and
recreational marijuana legalization at higher levels than
any other generation (Hargit & Geiger, 2018). In 2018,
74 percent of Millennials approved of legalization, com-
pared to 54 percent of Boomers. Generation X approval
is in the middle of the two generations, with 63 percent
supporting legalization. Generational differences in atti-
tudes on marijuana are much larger than differences by
education and race (Hargit & Geiger, 2018). Hargit and
Geiger (2018) conclude that the legalization ofmarijuana
connects to deeper values held by the Millennial gen-
eration, such as tolerance and support for ethnic and
racial justice.
Although Millennials have distinct views on these
two topic areas, they are similar to other generations
on a number of issues. For comparison Millennials hold
similar opinions to other generations on issues like abor-
tion, Social Security, and Medicare. In 2017, the 62 per-
cent of Millennials said abortion should be legal in all
or most cases, compared to 59 percent of Generation
Xers, 53 percent of Baby Boomers, and 48 percent of the
Silent Generation (Doherty, Kiley, & O’Hea, 2018). For
Social Security the difference across those who oppose
cuts in Social Security benefits is also moderate. 61 per-
cent of Millennials, 67 percent of Generation X, 69 per-
cent of Baby Boomers, and 74 percent of the Silent Gen-
eration believe benefits should not be reduced (Taylor,
2016). Finally, overwhelming majorities of each gener-
ation support Medicare. There is only a seven percent
range between the low end of support (Baby Boomers,
85 percent) and the high end (Silent Generation, 92 per-
cent). Millennials and Generation X fall between the
two with support at 87 percent and 89 percent respec-
tively (Taylor, 2016). In summary, Millennials are not
systematically different than other generations on ev-
ery issue; higher education reform and marijuana liber-
alization are two policy areas that are particularly dis-
tinct to the Millennial generation, especially compared
to other generations.
The usage of Millennial salient ballot measures over
the last two decades provides the context for testing a
few hypotheses. First, we predict that the number of Mil-
lennial salient measures will increase Millennial turnout
relative to the rest of the population. Just as ballot mea-
sures emphasizing issues important to evangelical voters
boosted their turnout (Campbell & Monson, 2008), we
expect measures on higher education and marijuana to
have the same effect for Millennial voters.
Hypothesis 1. Millennial turnout is expected to
increase as the number of Millennial measures
increases.
Additionally, the effect should be more pronounced in
midterm environments than presidential elections. His-
torically, there is a sharp drop in voter turnout from pres-
idential to midterm elections (A. Campbell, 1960; J. E.
Campbell, 1987; McDonald, 2018). In midterms, we ex-
pect measures to have a larger role because there is a
large pool of voters who vote in presidential elections,
but not inmidterms.Midtermelections create a strategic
opportunity for interest groups to mobilize bases of sup-
port to pass preferred policies (Anzia, 2011, 2013). We
argue that Millennial measures will provide the stimulus
to increase turnout amongMillennials that regularly vote
in presidential elections, but that do not in Midterms.
Salientmeasureswill have less of an effect in presidential
years because these elections are more salient to the av-
erage voter, and presidential campaigns have extensive
mobilization efforts that may supersede the effect of bal-
lot measures.
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Hypothesis 2. The turnout effects of Millennial salient
measures on Millennial turnout will be larger in
midterm than presidential elections.
5. Data and Methods
We use voter turnout data from the Current Popula-
tion Survey (CPS) Voting and Registration Supplement to
test our theory. This survey includes 700,000 individual
turnout records from 2002–2016. This telephone survey
has been conducted every two years in November and
includes US citizens age eighteen or older. The survey is
drawn from a stratified sample to create a representative
sample of adult citizens.
We choose 2002 as the start year for our sample be-
cause it is the first year Millennials make up a substantial
percentage of the CPS data: approximately 7 percent of
the sample2. The percentage of the CPS that is Millen-
nial grows each year as more Millennials become voting
age. Millennials constitute 28 percent of respondents in
the 2016 CPS3. We combine the CPS with a unique data
set of the number of Millennial salient ballot measures
from 2002–2016 using the National Conference of State
Legislatures’ (2016) Statewide BallotMeasures Database.
We identify any initiative or referendum that liberalizes
marijuana laws (both recreational andmedicinal) or aims
to make higher education more affordable or accessible.
We identify 1,599 statewide ballot measures (either ini-
tiative or referendum) during general elections in this
time period, with 90 being coded as Millennial-salient,
composing just over 6 percent of the sample. 55 percent
of the Millennial-salient measures were on higher edu-
cation reform, and 45 percent on marijuana liberaliza-
tion. We did not code measures as Millennial-salient if
they focused on making marijuana laws more restrictive
or if they were about higher education but did not em-
phasize affordability or availability. The average state had
.225 Millennial salient measures in each election, mean-
ing there was one measure roughly every four elections
per state in our sample. The sample has a high of five
measures in a state in a single election, and a low of zero.
Like other research in direct democracy (Bowler &
Donovan, 2004), we find that not all states are equal in
their usage of Millennial-salient measures. Rhode Island
and New Mexico had ten Millennial measures between
2002–2016, followedbyArizona (eight). Seven states had
three measures, six had two measures, seven had one
measure, and twenty-three states had no salient mea-
sures in the sample. Figure 1 shows the total number of
salient measures in our data by state.
Our dependent variable is voter turnout. We interact
our key independent variable,Millennial Measures, with
a measure of generation. We use Pew Research Center’s
age range for each living generation. Table 1 shows the
distribution of generations. Boomersmake up the largest























































Figure 1. Number of Millennial salient measures. Source: National Conference of State Legislatures (2016).
2 While the oldest of Millennials reached voting age in 2000, they did not make up a sufficiently large proportion of the sample for state level analysis.
3 Beginning in 2016, those born in 1997 and 1998 (Generation X) were eligible to vote. They make up .2 percent of the sample and are not large enough
to include as a separate generation, so they are omitted from the sample.
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Table 1. Distribution of Generations. Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2002–2016).
Generation Sample Size
Millennial 148,170 (19.7%)




nials and the Silent generation are roughly the same size.
We also use a binary indicator for Millennials in a par-
allel set of analyses. These two measures of generation
provide insights for howMillennials compare to other co-
horts as well as how they are different from the rest of
the population overall. In both sets ofmodels, we include
age to control for lifetime effects. Including age allows
us to distinguish between lifetime effects (aging, retire-
ment, etc.) versus generational effects that emerge from
the collective socialization of each generation. Specifi-
cally, life cycle effects are the idea that one’s habits and
opinions change over the course of their lives, and from
their maturation from being children, to young adults, to
adults, and to retirees. Alternatively, cohorts are a group
of individuals who have experienced the same event
within the same time interval (Ryder, 1965). One way to
better parse out age ormaturation effects from cohort ef-
fects is to include a control for age, and use binary indica-
tor for generations (O’Brien, Stockard, & Isaacson, 1999).
We estimate a multilevel logistic regression to model
individual voter turnout, with random intercepts for
state and fixed effects for year to account for state-level
differences in turnout and turnout effects of individual
election years. We estimate four models for each gen-
erational indicator; a pooled model with no interaction,
a pooled model interacting generation with Millennial
measures, the same interaction model but of only re-
spondents in initiative states, and finally the interaction
model of respondents living in a state with at least one
Millennial measure in that year. We choose initiative
states as a subsample because these states may have a
historical legacy of direct democracy that makes them
systematically different than non-initiative states. They
chose to adopt the initiative process, which potentially
indicates these states respond differently to voters. The
final set of models will compare midterm and presiden-
tial election turnout. These models will subsample the
data with both generational measures in just mid-term
and just presidential elections. This approach will test if
salient ballot measures can activate low propensity vot-
ers that are activated by presidential campaigns but do
not typically vote in midterm elections. These models
will identify contexts in which Millennial measures have
a greater effect on turnout, and which ones they do not.
Because the effects of direct democracy have been
shown to be conditional on electoral context, we include
an indicator for presidential election years, and identify
states that have competitive statewide elections for pres-
ident, US Senate, and governor. To further model com-
petitiveness, we include a measure for the total spend-
ing per capita of all US Senate, House, and presidential
campaigns in a state. We also use Li, PomanteII, and
Schraufnagel (2018) Cost of Voting index, which is an in-
dex of 33 state election and registration laws that mea-
sure the level of difficulty for voters to vote. Higher val-
ues indicate a higher cost of voting. These contextual vari-
ables help isolate the influence of ballot measures on
voting from other sources of increased voter turnout. Fi-
nally, we include individual demographic controls, includ-
ing income, age, race, and education. Table 2 shows the
descriptive statistics for each variable and Table 3 pro-
vides a brief description of variables.
6. Results
Table 4 models turnout using the categorical measure
of generation. The last three models interact each gen-
eration with the number of Millennial salient measures.
The first model shows differences across generations,
but without the interaction. The reference category is
the Baby Boomer generation. Figure 2 compares the pre-
dicted probability of voting for each generation based
on the results in model 4 of Table 4. Without accounting
for the potential moderating effect of Millennial salient
ballot measures, Millennials are eight to ten percentage
points less likely to vote than Baby Boomers or mem-
bers of the Silent Generation, while they vote at slightly
lower rates than Generation X voters. This supports the
existing literature that even when controlling for age, ed-
ucation, income, and other factors that influence voter
turnout, there are differences in turnout between gener-
ations (Franklin, 2004).
Model 2 shows the results for all elections in the sam-
ple. Millennials are less likely to vote than Baby Boomers
when the number of Millennial measures is zero. Gener-
ation X voters are also less likely to vote than Boomers,
and the Silent Generation is more likely to vote, hold-
ing all else constant and the number of Millennial mea-
sures at zero. Increasing the number of Millennial salient
measures has no effect on Generation X or Silent Gener-
ation voters compared to Boomers but increases turnout
among Millennials. This model supports our hypothesis
that Millennial salient measures will increase turnout
specifically amongMillennials. If there are fiveMillennial
measures in an election, turnout differences between
Millennials and Boomers disappear. Figure 3 shows the
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Table 2. Summary statistics.
Variable Mean Sd Min Max
Vote 0.622 0.485 0.000 1.000
Mil Measures 0.244 0.524 0.000 5.000
Millennial 0.171 0.376 0.000 1.000
Male 0.474 0.499 0.000 1.000
Age 47.846 17.695 18.000 85.000
Initiative State 0.482 0.500 0.000 1.000
Income 9.815 4.885 0.000 16.000
Missing Income 0.092 0.289 0.000 1.000
Education 3.219 1.546 1.000 6.000
Total Spending per Capita (Standardized) −0.000 1.000 −0.588 7.026
Competitive Gubernatorial Election 0.269 0.443 0.000 1.000
Competitive Senate Election 0.164 0.370 0.000 1.000
Competitive Presidential Election 0.175 0.380 0.000 1.000
Presidential Election 0.496 0.500 0.000 1.000
Cost of Voting Index 0.000 1.000 −3.979 1.841
Sources: US Census Bureau (2002–2016), National Conference of State Legislatures (2016) and The Campaign Finance Institute (2019).
Table 3. Description of variables.
Variable Description
Vote Binary Indicator for Vote/No Vote
Millennial Binary Indicator Millennial Generation
Generation Categorical Measure of Millennial, Generation X, Boomers, and Silent Generation,
generated by year of birth
Millennial Measures Number of Ballot Measures on marijuana liberalization or higher education reform in
a state in the general election
Age Age of respondent
Male Binary indicator for male/not male
Hispanic Binary indicator for Hispanic
Black Binary indicator for Black
Initiative Binary indicator for an initiative state
Income Categorical measure of income (CPS) from 1–16, grouping individuals by ranges of income
Missing Income Binary indicator for respondents with no information on their income. This was used to
preserve cases and not omit any systematic difference in the sample between those
that gave their income versus those that refused
Education 6 category measure of education ranging from less than high school to advanced degree
Federal Campaign Amount of money spent by major party federal campaigns (House, Senate, and President)
Spending in an election year in a state per capita. (This variable has been standardized)
Competitive Binary indicator-Campaign Finance Institute’s measure of competitive gubernatorial
Gubernatorial Race elections
Competitive Senate Race Binary indicator for senate race where margin of victory was less than 10 percent
Competitive Presidential Binary indicator for presidential race where margin of victory was less than 10 percent
Race
Presidential Election Binary indicator for presidential election year
Cost of Voting Lee et al’s (2018) measure of the cost of voting using a measure of 30 different electoral
laws in the states such as voter ID, registration regulations, and other laws
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Table 4. Generational model of turnout using total count of ballot measures in an election.
All States All States Initiative States States with Any Measures
Millennial −0.3954* −0.3514* −0.4068* −0.3943*
(0.0198) (0.0184) (0.0306) (0.0249)
Generation X −0.2888* −0.2818* −0.2858* −0.2722*
(0.0131) (0.0115) (0.0214) (0.0173)
Silent/Greatest 0.0869* 0.1124* 0.0961* 0.0675*
(0.0154) (0.0136) (0.0252) (0.0201)
Total Measures −0.0008 0.0035* −0.0025 −0.0013
(0.0017) (0.0014) (0.0022) (0.0019)
Millennial # Total Measures 0.0124* 0.0196* 0.0140*
(0.0021) (0.0028) (0.0025)
Generation X # Total Measures 0.0020 0.0041 0.0011
(0.0018) (0.0025) (0.0022)
Silent # Total Measures 0.0076* 0.0070* 0.0084*
(0.0021) (0.0029) (0.0025)
Age 0.0277* 0.0277* 0.0288* 0.0282*
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0006)
Male −0.1118* −0.1117* −0.1270* −0.1170*
(0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0082) (0.0067)
Hispanic −0.1679* −0.1662* −0.1547* −0.1321*
(0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0160) (0.0138)
Black 0.4814* 0.4813* 0.4407* 0.4550*
(0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0170) (0.0126)
Initiative State 0.1149* 0.1142* 0.1059
(0.0542) (0.0541) (0.0551)
Income 0.0870* 0.0870* 0.0866* 0.0862*
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0010)
Missing Income 0.7687* 0.7687* 0.7515* 0.7319*
(0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0204) (0.0165)
Education 0.3938* 0.3937* 0.3845* 0.3909*
(0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0032) (0.0025)
Federal Campaign Spending 0.0133* 0.0131* −0.0213* 0.0090
(0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0060) (0.0049)
Competitive Gub Race 0.0785* 0.0780* 0.1045* 0.0947*
(0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0106) (0.0091)
Competitive Senate Race 0.1052* 0.1049* 0.1474* 0.1172*
(0.0088) (0.0088) (0.0142) (0.0105)
Competitive Presidential Election 0.1203* 0.1202* 0.0735* 0.1008*
(0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0159) (0.0133)
Presidential Year 0.7404* 0.7409* 0.8141* 0.7424*
(0.0151) (0.0151) (0.0217) (0.0184)
Cost of Voting −0.0457* −0.0471* −0.0433* −0.0490*
(0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0077) (0.0068)
Constant −3.2652* −3.2801* −3.2043* −3.2677*
(0.0480) (0.0478) (0.0583) (0.0526)
var(𝛽State) 0.0359* 0.0359* 0.0340* 0.0363*
(0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0100) (0.0075)
Observations 668,352 668,352 321,885 478,033
Notes: * p < .05. All models include random intercepts for State and fixed effects for year.
marginal effect ofMillennialmeasures on turnout by gen-
eration. While these measures have no effect on other
generations, they increaseMillennial turnout by one per-
cent for each additional measure.
Models 3 and 4 compare the contextual effects of
salient measures by the ballot measure context. In both
models, Millennial measures have a mediated effect on
turnout for Millennials but not for other generations.
















































Figure 3. Marginal effect of Millennial measures on turnout by generation. Marginal effects shown are population-
averaged.
Note that when the number of measures is zero, there
are still persistent and substantively large turnout gaps
between generations. The fourth model shows that the
relationship is not being driven by just whether states
have any measures salient to Millennials, but that the
number of measures is also important. Even when iso-
lated to just states that have measures on the ballot
in an election, additional Millennial measures increase
turnout among Millennials.
Other contextual variables are largely congruentwith
our expectations. Initiative states have somewhat higher
turnout, and competitive gubernatorial, senatorial, and
presidential elections in a state all increase voter turnout.
As the cost of voting increases, citizens become less
likely to vote. In the pooled model, increased federal
campaign spending per capita is significantly related to
increased voter turnout. Additionally, presidential elec-
tions see higher turnout than non-presidential elections.
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Table 6 compares the effect of salient ballot measures in
midterm and presidential elections. As can be seen, Mil-
lennial measures have no generational effects in presi-
dential elections, but have a positive and significant ef-
fect on Millennial turnout in midterm elections. Salient
measures appear to be activating Millennials in midterm
elections, taking a similar role to presidential campaigns
in presidential election years.
7. Millennials versus the Rest of the Population
Table 5 is the same specification as Table 4 but uses a bi-
nary measure to compare Millennials to the rest of the
population. In the model with no interaction, Millennials
do not vote at significantly different rates than the rest of
the population after controlling for demographic factors.
This is likely because Generation X voter turnout is much
closer to Millennial turnout than Boomer or Silent Gen-
eration voters. Yet despite similarities in baseline levels
of turnout between Millennials and other voters when
there are no Millennial measures on the ballot, only Mil-
lennials appear to be affected bymeasures onmarijuana
liberalization or higher education reform. When the in-
teraction is included, Millennials are less likely to vote
than the rest of the population when there are no salient
measures. The difference in turnout is small enough that
Table 5. Binary Millennial measure model of turnout using total count of ballot measures.
All States All States Initiative States States with Any Measures
Millennial −0.0421* −0.0064 −0.0546* −0.0548*
(0.0117) (0.0098) (0.0191) (0.0157)
Total Measures 0.0017 0.0036* 0.0006 0.0011
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0018) (0.0015)
Millennial # Total Measures 0.0101* 0.0165* 0.0117*
(0.0018) (0.0025) (0.0022)
Age 0.0370* 0.0370* 0.0382* 0.0370*
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Male −0.1097* −0.1096* −0.1253* −0.1150*
(0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0082) (0.0067)
Hispanic −0.1699* −0.1680* −0.1565* −0.1346*
(0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0160) (0.0138)
Black 0.4833* 0.4831* 0.4416* 0.4566*
(0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0170) (0.0126)
Initiative State 0.1145* 0.1136* 0.1058
(0.0542) (0.0542) (0.0552)
Income 0.0880* 0.0879* 0.0872* 0.0870*
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0010)
Missing Income 0.7777* 0.7778* 0.7582* 0.7400*
(0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0204) (0.0165)
Education 0.3918* 0.3917* 0.3825* 0.3891*
(0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0031) (0.0025)
Federal Campaign Spending 0.0134* 0.0132* −0.0212* 0.0093
(0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0060) (0.0049)
Competitive Gub Race 0.0788* 0.0780* 0.1048* 0.0949*
(0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0106) (0.0091)
Competitive Senate Race 0.1049* 0.1045* 0.1463* 0.1164*
(0.0088) (0.0088) (0.0142) (0.0105)
Competitive Presidential Election 0.1205* 0.1204* 0.0737* 0.1014*
(0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0159) (0.0133)
Presidential Year 0.6258* 0.6264* 0.6994* 0.6327*
(0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0198) (0.0169)
Cost of Voting −0.0456* −0.0470* −0.0429* −0.0485*
(0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0077) (0.0068)
Constant −3.7763* −3.7818* −3.7110* −3.7562*
(0.0419) (0.0419) (0.0471) (0.0447)
var(𝛽State) 0.0360* 0.0360* 0.0341* 0.0364*
(0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0100) (0.0075)
Observations 668,352 668,352 321,885 478,033
Notes: * p < .05. All models include random intercepts for State and fixed effects for year.
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oneMillennial measure is enough to result in Millennials
being more likely to vote than the rest of the population.
Figure 4 shows the predicted probabilities for
model 2 of Table 5. When there are no measures on the
ballot, Millennials vote at basically the same rate as the
rest of the population, controlling for other factors. As
the number of measures increases, so does Millennial
turnout while the rest of the population barely changes
and moves in a slightly negative direction. Millennial
turnout increases by roughly one percentage point for
each additional salient measure on the ballot. When
states have five measures on the ballot, there is roughly
a six percent difference in turnout between Millennials
and the rest of the population. Inmodels 3 and 4, there is
no significant difference betweenMillennial turnout and
the rest of the population when there are no Millennial
measures, but Millennial measures still increase Millen-
nial turnout.
Controlling for other factors, Millennials are more
likely to vote than the rest of the population in a variety
of contexts as the number of measures increases. The
contextual electoral variables largely have the same ef-
fect as in Table 3. Voters in initiative states with com-
petitive elections, a low cost of voting, and with a pres-
idential election are more likely to vote. Table 6 com-
pares the models in midterm and presidential elections
using both the generational and binarymeasures to iden-
tify Millennials. Again, Millennial measures do not have
a significant interactive effect with generation in pres-
idential elections but does in midterm elections. Mil-
lennial measures still have a mediating effect after con-
trolling for context, but the effect is concentrated in
midterm elections.
8. Discussion and Conclusion
These findings have several important implications. First,
we have demonstrated that there are real differences be-
tween generations in political participation. Controlling
for a variety of factors (including age and electoral com-
petitiveness),Millennials are less likely to vote thanother
generations. We find consistent generational declines in
voter turnout, which could have long lasting implications
for American democracy as an increasing number of citi-
zens stop participating.
We have also shown that the electoral context has
a different effect depending on the generation. For all
sets of models, Millennials are significantlymore likely to
vote when there aremoremeasures on the ballot salient
to them. The effect cancels out any generational differ-
ences between Millennials and other cohorts. Millenni-
als are the only age group affected by these measures
as we observe no significant increases or decreases in
turnout in other generations. They are not completely
disengaged from the political process but will be more
likely to participate when the system is responding to
their preferences. These findings provide more support
for arguments that much of Bernie Sanders’ success with
youth voters was due to his emphasis on issues impor-
tant to Millennials, particularly his support for tuition
free university education. When elections include dis-
cussion of issues salient to Millennials, they turnout at
higher rates.
Substantively the effect size of increased Millennial
ballot measures is between a one and two percent-
age point increase in turnout for Millennials for each
























Figure 4. Predicted probability of voting- Millennials vs rest of population. Probabilities shown are population-averaged
probabilities.
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Table 6. Comparing presidential and mid-term elections.
Presidential- Mid-Term- Presidential-Binary Mid-Term-Binary
Generational Generations Measure Measure
Millennial −0.3194∗ −0.5110∗ −0.0064 −0.1511∗
(0.0279) (0.0253) (0.0149) (0.0152)




Millennial Measures −0.0167 −0.0113 −0.0018 −0.0049
(0.0138) (0.0148) (0.0091) (0.0111)
Millennial # Millennial Measures 0.0109 0.1182∗ 0.0132 0.1124∗
(0.0207) (0.0258) (0.0181) (0.0238)
Gen X # Millennial Measures 0.0053 −0.0113
(0.0194) (0.0202)
Silent # Millennial Measures −0.0065 0.0419
(0.0215) (0.0221)
Age 0.0216∗ 0.0323∗ 0.0299∗ 0.0417∗
(0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Male −0.1981∗ −0.0422∗ −0.1971∗ −0.0391∗
(0.0085) (0.0077) (0.0085) (0.0077)
Hispanic −0.1622∗ −0.1897∗ −0.1261∗ −0.1922∗
(0.0153) (0.0177) (0.0153) (0.0177)
Black 0.6175∗ 0.3790∗ 0.6200∗ 0.3822∗
(0.0157) (0.0139) (0.0158) (0.0139)
Income 0.0899∗ 0.0842∗ 0.0910∗ 0.0859∗
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012)
Missing Income 0.7590∗ 0.7641∗ 0.7666∗ 0.7787∗
(0.0201) (0.0190) (0.0200) (0.0190)
Education 0.4564∗ 0.3520∗ 0.4560∗ 0.3500∗
(0.0034) (0.0028) (0.0034) (0.0028)
Cong Campaign Spending 0.0114 0.0392∗ 0.0157∗ 0.0394∗
(0.0063) (0.0042) (0.0065) (0.0042)
Competitive Gub Race 0.0179 0.0961∗ −0.0341∗ 0.0959∗
(0.0164) (0.0090) (0.0168) (0.0091)
Competitive Senate Race 0.0301∗ 0.1514∗ −0.0083 0.1509∗
(0.0142) (0.0119) (0.0151) (0.0118)
Competitive Pres Election 0.0635∗ 0.0384∗
(0.0109) (0.0144)
Initiative State 0.4262∗ 0.2016∗ 0.2143∗ 0.2010∗
(0.0139) (0.0093) (0.0135) (0.0092)
Cost of Voting −0.0004 −0.0888∗ −0.0268∗ −0.0892∗
(0.0055) (0.0046) (0.0053) (0.0047)
Constant −2.3079∗ −3.3161∗ −2.6720∗ −3.8476∗
(0.0446) (0.0390) (0.0303) (0.0246)
var(𝛽State) 2.0725e+08* 86564960.66* 1.9222e+08* 86624295.89*
(10679863.1088) (3920093.018) (13332112.51) (3854348.487)
Observations 329,368 338,984 329,368 338,984
Notes: All models include random intercepts for State and fixed effects for year. * indicates p < .05.
presidential election was decided by roughly 100,000
voters in Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Michigan, and
many razor thin margins in US House and Senate elec-
tions in 2018, a two-percentage point increase in Mil-
lennial turnout could have a tremendous effect on elec-
tion results. A two-percentage point increase in Millen-
nial turnout translates into 1.5 million more voters par-
ticipating in elections.
Secondly, our findings support existing research that
direct democracy has a context-dependent effect on
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voter turnout, and that the effect is largest in low turnout
contexts. We find that the turnout effect is mostly con-
centrated in midterm contests, which historically have
lower levels of turnout, particularly for Millennial voters.
It appears that these salient measures act in a similar
way as presidential campaigns in mobilizing Millennial
voters. Differences between Millennial and other gener-
ations are largest when there is no presidential election
or salient measures. That being said, not all measures
are created equal. The turnout effect of ballot measures
is concentrated on issues that are salient to a particu-
lar voter group. Just as Smith et al. (2006) and Campbell
and Monson (2008) find that same sex marriage bans in-
creased conservative Christian turnout in the 2004 pres-
idential election, we find that when measures focus on
issues salient to Millennials, their turnout increases.
Lastly, wewant to emphasize the implication of these
findings on American political behavior over time. The
surge in turnout in the 2018 midterm non-withstanding
(McDonald, 2018), there are fears that disillusionment
with the political system is leading to increasingly low
turnout elections, particularly in midterms. A key point
of emphasis for activists is getting low propensity voters
to participate. Salient ballot measures may be a way to
not only accomplish policy goals, but to also engage pop-
ulations that turnout at lower levels. Repeated elections
with mobilizing measures could create millions of habit-
ual voters (Plutzer, 2002) who will be more likely to par-
ticipate in future elections even without the stimulus of
salient measures.
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